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1 Introduction
In the age of securitisation, economists and bank practitioners take a strong interest in what
makes bank lending special.
1 This knowledge would make it possible to draw an appropriate
borderline between securities markets and bank lending as the main sources of external corpo-
rate finance. It would also explain the product to its producer and could therefore be the
source for product improvements, i.e. the construction of lending relationships of greater social
value. Unfortunately, bank lending relationships are of a rather complex nature. This is due to
the diversity and breadth of corporate investments financed by banks. It is also attributable to
the fact that lending relationships involve the multistage strategic interaction of a multitude of
actors under uncertainty. Therefore, although much empirical and theoretical work has been
done recently on the subject, our knowledge is still incomplete and cannot yet serve as a stra-
tegic guideline for bank policy or corporate finance.
One way to learn more about bank lending is to examine existing lending relationships. Our
paper is based on six lending relationships of a Bavarian bank. We were able to study the six
credit files in the context of a more comprehensive study prepared by the Center for Financial
Studies in Frankfurt.
2 Unlike the CFS study, we did not standardise, ex ante, the information
we registered, but instead analysed the credit files very intensively and from a very close per-
spective. For each individual case we recorded facts from a great number of documents, more
than in other comparable studies. Of course, we had to structure and aggregate our results,
partly because we had to keep the firms anonymous. Nonetheless, the credit files of the six
medium-sized firms tell six interesting stories about bank lending and give some general ideas
about how the interaction between banks and their debtors might work.
2 Bank lending – theory and empirical evidence
Economic theory motivates the existence of banks with their ability to produce information
about their debtors.
3 The seminal text on this approach to financial intermediation, Diamond
(1984), interprets banks as delegated monitors. They monitor their debtors on behalf of de-
positors. Diamond introduces two technologies to control debtors. The first, a non-monetary
penalty in case of insolvency, is used to control the bank itself. The resulting contract is
equivalent to the standard debt contract of Townsend (1979) and Gale/Hellwig (1985). The
second technology implies the costly verification of the true situation of the debtor and, im-
plicitly, the ability to make the debtor pay his debt if possible. How this could be done is not
specified, although the existence of this second technology is essential.
Today, monitoring is often interpreted in a broad sense, referring to all activities undertaken by
banks to prevent opportunistic behaviour by debtors.
4 This aspect is closely related to the abil-
ity of banks to renegotiate debt contracts. In both cases the close and enduring relationship
between bank and debtor allows problems of incomplete information or incomplete contracts
to be solved in a way not available to the participants of anonymous capital markets. There-
fore, banks can be understood as both delegated monitors and delegated contractors. Much
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2 For general information about this data set see Elsas/Henke/Machauer/Rott/Schenk (1997).
3 For an overview see Neuberger (1994), pp. 31-70.
4 See Freixas/Rochet (1997), p. 17, or Besanko/Kanatas (1993). The latter authors are also particularly un-
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theoretical and empirical work has been done recently to illustrate the different aspects of rela-
tionship lending by banks. The following limited overview pays special regard to what these
models and empirical findings tell us about the monitoring process itself.
Diamond (1991) develops a model of bank lending in which firms can gain reputation through
banks’ monitoring. Findings of abnormal positive market returns after the publication of new
bank debt or renewal of already existing debt seem to support this view.
5 But similar results
can be obtained for non-bank lending, indicating that it is not the lender’s identity but its finan-
cial standing which explains positive capital market reactions.
6 A special monitoring ability of
banks is neither described nor proved by this approach.
On the other hand, reputation is an useful argument to bind the behaviour of banks in long
term lending relationships. This bonding is valuable when banks offer a kind of insurance for
firms (see e.g. Sharpe (1990), Fischer (1990)), consisting of an interest rate smoothing or li-
quidity insurance, and naturally wish to repudiate their implicit obligations in case of financial
distress on the part of the debtor. Given that, in the long run, banks offering this kind of sup-
port should also gain from their ability to do so, there must be some kind of intertemporal or
interfirm compensation, which is very hard to prove empirically (see for Germany El-
sas/Krahnen (1997) and Harhoff/Körting (1997)). A deeper insight into the monitoring process
itself cannot be expected to emerge from this approach because it does not focus on the infor-
mation transfer between debtor and bank.
The potential for intertemporal compensation is strengthened if bank and debtor coexist in a
bilateral information monopoly. Therefore exclusiveness might contribute to the value of a
lending relationship (see Petersen/Rajan (1994) for an empirical proof of this hypothesis). On
the other hand, this monopoly might give banks superior bargaining power and, in effect, lead
to adverse investment incentives for the debtors. Multiple empirical evidence shows that cor-
porate debtors reduce this effect by having a greater number of banking relationships
(Berger/Udell (1995), Elsas/Krahnen (1997)).
7 Only anecdotal evidence exists for another way
to reduce the information lock-in: debtors are often reluctant to transfer available information
to their creditors, possibly because they can use this information to reduce the adverse selec-
tion effect when intending to transfer their main credit relationship to another bank. Consis-
tently with this idea, a questionnaire-based study conducted at the University of Frankfurt
(Thiessen (1994)) documents a great discrepancy between the kind of information bank credit
officers would like to use and the kind of information they actually get.
Bargaining power becomes important when financial contracts are renegotiated. Although re-
negotiation takes place almost continually in corporate finance, major wealth shifts can be ex-
pected in the case of financial distress when the bargaining power of the debtor is diminished
by the threat of insolvency. A growing body of literature deals with financial contracts and
recontracting with respect to security design (e.g. Harris/Raviv (1995)) and financial structure
(Dewatripont/Tirole (1994)), or with institutionalised recontracting according to national
bankruptcy laws in restructuring methods (Bebchuck/Chang (1992), Aghion/Hart/ Moore
(1992) and many others). Different types of recontracting regimes (i.e. bankruptcy laws) are
analysed extensively, - if they can be publicly observed and therefore are transparent for scien-
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tific researchers.
8 When dealing with the special abilities of banks to renegotiate financial con-
tracts, publicly notorious cases are of less interest than might be expected. Banks should be
able to recontract at low cost, and therefore at a low level of publicity. Bankruptcy laws only
determine the threat point of these bilateral renegotiations, but say nothing about the recon-
tracting game itself.
As mentioned above, debtors wishing to keep their bargaining power might be unwilling to
reduce information asymmetry below a certain level. Recontracting in distress can be adversely
affected by this substantial amount of information asymmetry. If distress occurs, debtors might
use costly signalling to avoid inefficiencies. Mooradian (1994) discusses signalling in distress
with respect to chapter 11 filing. Detragiache (1995) proposes a model of capital structure
signalling in the style of Ross (1977) for private workouts. An interesting result of this model
is that debtors can only signal if their bargaining power in the official bankruptcy procedure is
not too big. Therefore, the strong position of creditors in the German insolvency code might
favour private workouts of restructuring agreements, whereas, due to their weak position un-
der chapter 11 in the United States, a bank-dominated private workout might not be feasible in
the US. There is some evidence in the cases reported in the present paper that bank and debtor
do in fact play a signalling game in the case of distress.
Haubrich (1989), transferring a general concept developed by Radner (1981, 1985), describes
relationship lending as a supergame in correlated strategies.
9 During a review phase the banks
receive a sequence of cheap signals about debtors’ behaviour. The bank punishes the debtor
during a penalty phase if he does not pass a simple statistical test at the end of the review
phase. This test almost certainly reveals misbehaviour by debtors, and therefore renders feasi-
ble allocations that are superior to allocations which can be reached with short-term contracts.
Burghof (1998), interpreting the review test as a solvency test and the utility in the penalty
phase as the result of a private workout, demonstrates that the long-term relationship also de-
pends on a strong position of debtors in the official bankruptcy procedures.
10 Again, the Ger-
man insolvency code favours a game as described above, whereas lending contracts with banks
might have a different character in the United States. We have not heard of any empirical proof
of this interpretation in the existing literature.
Taking these results together, we can draw some motivation for the approach followed in this
paper: lending relationship design depends on the country-specific institutional setting. There-
fore, even highly informative data about lending in other countries (like Berlin/Mester (1997)
about the US) is of limited value for Germany. And little is known about the intertemporal and
strategic aspect of relationship lending in Germany (or anywhere else), although this aspect
seems to be crucial for our understanding. The reason is easy to see: During a lending relation-
ship lasting many years a great amount of potentially interesting information arises and is
documented in the credit files on paper, but only partially in electronic format. Recording and
analysing all this information for a large number of credit files is beyond the capacity of scien-
tific research. The necessary aggregation of data or even exclusion from the analysis of some
documents should be based on an in-depth knowledge of what information they contain and to
what degree this information is relevant to describe long-term lending relationships. Therefore,
the development of stylised facts for further research still requires a lot of ”storytelling”, as is
done below.
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3 The data set
Our data stems from the credit files of six medium-sized corporate customers of a major
Bavarian bank. The customers were selected by the bank’s credit officers in response to six
predefined types we deemed to be typical or of special interest. These predefined cases were:
K1: a lending relationship without a significant negative credit event (straight course),
K2: a lending relationship terminated by the bank (premature termination),
K3: a lending relationship based on the monitoring activities of another bank, which in the case
actually studied was a foreign bank (second bank),
K4: a lending relationship in which a negative trend was turned around (turnaround),
K5: a lending relationship with a private workout of a restructuring agreement (private work-
out),
K6: a lending relationship with bankruptcy of the debtor (bankruptcy).
We recorded and classified every document in the credit files containing information gathered
by the bank or describing interaction between the debtor and the bank. Credit files were avail-
able for about five years, i.e. from 1992 to 1996.
Compared with other studies these data have three main advantages, which compensate for the
small number of cases investigated:
- The information is taken from internal credit files and not from questionnaires as in other
comparable studies about bank lending in Germany.
11 It should therefore be less biased by
whatever ideas the person answering a questionnaire might have about proper bank be-
haviour.
12
- Taking all potentially relevant events into account should reduce the analytical bias result-
ing from our own ideas about the lending process.
- This is the only study concentrating on monitoring and recontracting as a procedure over
the course of time.
 Nonetheless, we do not pretend to have gained representative results, and we view some of
our conclusions as hypotheses for further empirical research.
 In the next chapter we outline the process of information gathering by the bank, based on the
following criteria: availability to other market participants, origin, temporal perspective and
cost of the information. Subsequently, the behaviour of debtors and bank lending officers is
described. Special interest is taken in activities which might potentially bind the future behav-
iour of debtors. Of course, information gathering is part of the behaviour of lending officers.
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Thiessen (1994) and Harhoff/Körting (1997).
12 It should be mentioned that the credit files appeared not to have been rearranged by the bank employees be-
fore we analysed them. A possible bias could therefore only result from the selection process itself.6
Therefore, in the last chapter information gathering and other actions of debtors and bank
lending officers are brought together. We conclude with some general hypotheses about the
nature of lending relationships.
 
 4 Information gathering by banks
 4.1 Information in the credit files
 The defining characteristic of information in the present context is its documentation in the
credit files, where it served as the basis for the decisions of the bank’s employees. Therefore,
we recorded as an ”information event” every document in the credit files with informational
content about debtors’ creditworthiness, regardless of its nature or size. For example, not only
extensive expert opinions or consultant reports were counted, but also newspaper cuttings or
internal computerised inquiries. We had to exclude from our analysis those documents to
which it was not possible to assign a specific date and origin.
 Because only documents still in the credit files at the date of our survey could be taken into
account, one would expect the number of information events to decrease with growing tempo-
ral distance from our survey. This phenomenon can be observed in all six cases and distorts the
results. For an analysis of a broader database this effect could be corrected by an adequate
regression. For the six cases analysed in this paper we are content with the evolving structure
of information gathering without correction.
 The following table gives a general overview of the information events in the six credit files:
   Total number of
information events
 Observation period  Information events
p.a.
 K1: Straight course  43  55 months  9.4
 K2: Premature termination  86  55 months  18.8
 K3: Second bank  49  34 months  17.3
 K4: Turnaround  181  59 months  36.8
 K5: Private workout  165  59 months  35.6
 K6: Bankruptcy  144  59 months  29.3
 Average:  111.3  53.5 months  24.5
 The comparatively high number of information events in all six cases gives a first impression of
the intensity of relationship lending.
 4.2 Public versus private information
 A bilateral informational monopoly should rest on information not available to other market
participants. Summarising the results of the study made at the University of Frankfurt, Thies-
sen casts doubts on this view of relationship lending.
13 According to the questionnaires, bank
lending officers mainly use public information about past performance, whereas complex, in-
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ternal data such as forecasts or financial planning statements are not applied - even though they
might shed light on the potential success of debtors’ investments.
 Our results contradict the statement that banks mainly used information which was available to
all other market participants. As public information we counted extracts from the register of
companies or from the land register, status enquiries from mercantile or credit reporting agen-
cies, sector reports and newspaper cuttings. All other information is not freely available to the
markets. As can be seen below, only a few information events fall into the category of public
information:
   Number of events  Percentage
   Public
information
 Private
information
 Public
information
 Private
information
 K1: Straight course  2  41  5%  95%
 K2: Premature termination  17  69  20%  80%
 K3: Second bank  4  45  8%  92%
 K4: Turnaround  7  174  4%  96%
 K5: Private workout  7  158  4%  96%
 K6: Bankruptcy  5  139  3%  97%
 Total:  42  626  6%  94%
 The medium-sized firms in the sample did not have to (and did not) publish their annual finan-
cial statements. Thus, balance sheet data were not counted as public information. However,
even if they had been regarded as public information, this would not have changed the results
significantly. Some public information, e.g. newspaper articles, might be observed by the lend-
ing officers without being documented in the credit files, but the same is true for private infor-
mation, e.g. unofficial enquiries or computer research.
 A greater amount of public information was only used in the case of premature termination
(K2), possibly due to a significant lack of co-operation on the part of the debtor. In general,
the bank used little public information. This result supports the traditional concept of lending
relationships as being separated from the public capital markets by informational asymmetry.
 4.3 Expensive versus cheap information
 According to Thiessen’s second statement, banks - regrettably - do not use complex internal
data, and in particular, forecasts made by their debtors, despite the fact that information stem-
ming from these sources would probably be of greater value for a prediction of the borrower’s
future success than the commonly used retrospective balance sheet numbers. At the same time,
however, there are good reasons for lenders not to rely on a firm’s internal information. For
one thing, internal information provided by debtors reflects their particular viewpoint, and thus
may not be very useful for creditors owning very different financial claims towards the firm.
For another, complex prospective data could be very expensive. If the existence of banks is
motivated by their ability to produce information about debtors, they could be expected to use8
their resources economically and to employ expensive means of information-gathering spar-
ingly.
 To illustrate this idea, we roughly divided the data into expensive and cheap information. In-
formation is expensive if it is difficult to capture and is prepared especially for the bank’s in-
formational needs. It is cheap if it is either easy to obtain or has to be available anyway in order
to comply with legal regulations. According to this classification, expert opinions and consult-
ant reports, the presence of bank advisers in the firm of the debtor, inspections and reviews of
their internal accounts, financial planning statements and other prospective studies are expen-
sive. Extracts from public registers, bankers’ references and the credit reports from the re-
gional Bundesbank offices,
14 status enquiries from mercantile or credit reporting agencies,
sector reports, newspaper articles, routine checks and analyses using the bank’s computer sys-
tem, and finally conversations with customers taking place inside the bank yield cheap infor-
mation. In addition, balance sheet information is cheap because it must be prepared anyway
and is analysed routinely with a computer program. The classification does not consider who
has to pay for the information, assuming that only the total cost of information is relevant for
the efficiency of bank lending.
15
 We can observe that the bank usually utilises cheap information. If problems arise, not only the
total number of informational events increases, but also the relative importance of expensive
information. Although no approximation of information costs can be expected to emerge from
our rough classification of information events, we can at least guess from our data that infor-
mation costs are many times higher in cases of distress than under ordinary conditions.
 To illustrate this result we first compare the yearly average of information events in our six
cases:
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 The average percentage of expensive information is 14.2% for all information events, or 12.4%
if all six cases are weighted equally. Considering the six cases individually, the percentages are
as follows:
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15 Sometimes we could not decide on whether an information event was expensive or not; therefore, the total
number of information events we took into account here is smaller than in the other chapters.9
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 3.1%  10.2%  17.1%  27.6%  6.7%  9.7%        
 Private workout (K5) and bankruptcy (K6) show a comparatively small relative amount of
expensive information. But its importance rises in years of crisis. In the following charts, years
of crisis can be identified in all six cases by the greater number and higher cost of information
events:
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 In the bankruptcy case (K6) the bank stopped information production in December 1994,
about one year before the bankruptcy actually took place. For the lending relationship without
apparent problems (K1), the increasing information production after 1994 was motivated by
negative forecasts for the economic sector and not by a deterioration in the creditworthiness of
the debtor itself. In the case of the second-bank relationship (K3), informational needs resulted
from the debtor’s opaque contingencies and commitments within the group to which it be-
longed.10
 In summary, the bank did use expensive information when needed. If no problems occurred,
either the bank did not want to use it or the debtor was not willing to give away such valuable
information. Assuming that the proportion of debtors in distress in the loan portfolio of banks
is small, it is not surprising that the relative importance of expensive information is also small,
as documented in the questionnaires used in connection with the Frankfurt study. Nonetheless,
its substantial qualitative importance for long-term relationship lending should not be disre-
garded.
 4.4 Perspective and origin of information
 In cases of distress, the bank also used information of different origins and different temporal
perspectives than under ordinary conditions. We observe a tendency towards greater use of
prospective data (although the relative importance of prospective data is always small), and a
growing interest in external sources of information. In cases of trouble, external data has an
importance equal to or exceeding the importance of internal information.
 Bank-internal statements, either as a part of the internal rating or made by lending officers in a
non-standardised manner, are defined as prospective data. We also consider third party state-
ments by auditors or consultants about the future development of the firm and various kinds of
budget planning to be prospective. All other information is retrospective.
16 Based on this parti-
tion, we obtain the following numbers for the total observation period of each lending relation-
ship:
   Number of events  Percentage
   Retrospective  Prospective  Retrospective  Prospective
 K1: Straight course  42  1  98%  2%
 K2: Premature termination  85  1  99%  1%
 K3: Second bank  43  6  88%  12%
 K4: Turnaround  140  41  77%  23%
 K5: Private workout  149  16  90%  10%
 K6: Bankruptcy  140  4  97%  3%
 Total:  599  69  90%  10%
 Internal information of the bank is defined as comprising statements by lending officers, com-
puterised analyses of the debtor’s balance sheet data or bank accounts, internal ratings and
other surveys based on internal data, and the outcomes of discussions with representatives of
the debtor. By contrast, external information is interpreted as consisting of extracts from public
registers, bankers’ references, status enquires from mercantile or credit reporting agencies, the
credit reports from the regional Bundesbank offices, publications in newspapers and other
analyses of the debtor or his business sector by third parties, e.g. consultants, auditors or re-
search agencies. We obtain the following result for the total observation period:
                                                       
 
16 We do not take into account the potential prognostic value of balance sheet data.11
   Number of events  Percentage
   External  Internal  External  Internal
 K1: Straight course  8  35  19%  81%
 K2: Premature termination  40  46  47%  53%
 K3: Second bank  25  24  51%  49%
 K4: Turnaround  120  61  66%  34%
 K5: Private workout  94  71  57%  43%
 K6: Bankruptcy  59  85  41%  59%
 Total:  346  322  52%  48%
 The changing level of information production from internal and retrospective to external and
prospective sources in cases of distress becomes apparent when the last two tables are com-
bined. The following diagram shows the percentage of external and prospective data on the x-
and y-axis respectively:
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 The most exhaustive information production took place for the turnaround (K4), correlating
with the use of a lot of expensive information. Private workout (K5) and the second-bank
lending relationship (K3) are dominated by the turnaround (K4), but dominate the remaining
three cases. In K3 the bank was apparently unwilling to trust the monitoring activities of the
other bank. And, in addition to normal monitoring activities, the lending officers had to find
out about the true contingencies and commitments of the debtor in a complex group structure,
which might explain the surprisingly high level of information production in this case. The low
level of information production in the bankruptcy case (K6) is perhaps surprising and will need
some further consideration, whereas in the case of premature termination (K2) it is caused by
the unwillingness of the debtor to give away substantial information about his firm. The lowest
level of information production is shown for K1.
 12
 5 Behaviour of debtors and bank reactions
 5.1 Debtors’ signals
 All documents classified as information events also contain some information about debtors’
behaviour. However, in some cases there is an especially close correlation between debtors’
behaviour and the information the bank receives. We call these information events signals. The
debtor might want to confirm his creditworthiness through positive signals, or might not bother
to prevent negative signals. Negative signals include unwillingness to present certain informa-
tion, the breaking of agreements, frequent status enquiries from third parties, and an overall
lack of co-operative behaviour. Positive signals are capital contributions or other signs of
commitment, the explicit presentation of positive advances or results, and generally co-
operative behaviour. It should be mentioned that lending officers frequently documented in the
credit files their impression that the borrower was willing (or as the case may be, unwilling) to
co-operate.
 The following chart represents the yearly average of positive and negative signals:
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 At first sight, there is a strikingly small number of positive signals in the credit files. This could
result from a bias in the lending officers’ perception: On the one hand, they expect co-
operation as a general precondition, and therefore do not document it explicitly. If they receive
negative signals, they take them as an exception and a warning and consequently record them.
In addition, lending officers might want to exculpate themselves through greater accuracy with
respect to negative signals. On the other hand, debtors might have a strong bargaining position
and therefore feel no need to produce positive signals or avoid negative signals.
 A strategic use of signals might be suspected in the turnaround case (K4), which is outstanding
for the high number of positive signals. Apparently, the debtor wanted to indicate in advance
his willingness to jointly solve the problems that were emerging:13
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 5.2 Bonding of debtors’ behaviour
 In the tradition of Jensen/Meckling (1976), banks’ monitoring is complemented by bonding
through debtors. In our context bonding measures are closely related to signals. In the theo-
retical literature, signalling is mainly interpreted as a method of avoiding adverse selection,
17
whereas bonding deals with moral hazard in an already existing contractual relationship. In
reality, the two aspects are merged. Debtors might give certain signals to assure creditors
about their future behaviour and thereby try to gain support for a restructuring plan. With the
same signal, they could want to distinguish themselves from other debtors also claiming sup-
port.
 Even if the distinction between signalling and bonding is not clear-cut, we can identify certain
activities of debtors which have a special bonding effect. Bonding of future behaviour can con-
cern the current managers of the debtor’s firm, its owners or even third parties. With respect to
the activities of the firm’s managers, collateral plays a crucial role. Because collateralised as-
sets cannot be sold, they bind investment behaviour. And, if assets serve as collateral, they
cannot be used to secure fresh debt and thereby bind financing behaviour.
18 Likewise, owners
can bind their future behaviour through capital contributions and guarantees, and so can third
parties which might want to acquire an interest in the firm.
 The comparison of the frequency of bonding activities shows that the turnaround (K4) features
prominently again, whereas in the case without problems (K1), premature termination (K2),
and monitoring by another bank (K3), bonding hardly ever occurs:
                                                       
 
17 The seminal paper on signalling in financial economics is Ross (1977).
 
18 See Rudolph (1984).14
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 Most bonding activities (28) are concerned with the behaviour of managers. This is no sur-
prise: this category (as defined above) includes all collateralisation activities, which are tradi-
tionally of great importance for bank lending in Germany. Of the remaining 28, 16 bonding
activities were carried out by the owners and 12 by third parties. If we concentrate on the three
cases with a considerable number of bonding activities (K4, K5 and K6), we find remarkable
concentrations in some of these categories. In the private workout case (K5), third party in-
volvement appears to be of crucial importance, whereas in the turnaround (K4) only managers
and owners were involved. In the bankruptcy case (K6) bonding activities concentrate on the
securing of already existing collateral, whereas neither owners nor a third party made a com-
mitment worth mentioning:
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 Bonding activities appear in the three cases in which an intensive recontracting process should
have taken place. In the two cases where recontracting was successful, bonding activities are
clustered in the years of crisis and appear to be part of packages agreed on by the parties in-
volved. The following chart shows their temporal distribution in the turnaround case (K4):15
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 5.3 Reaction of bank lending officers
 The bank’s reactions consist primarily of all contractual measures, e.g. the granting, prolonga-
tion, expansion, reduction of a loan, and the termination of the loan agreement. We also re-
corded rejections of loan requests, threats to call in a loan, requests for more information or
additional collateral, or the desire to renegotiate the lending agreements. Finally, an explicit
intensification of monitoring, notification that the loan has been categorised as a problem loan,
changes in pricing or in the general policy towards the exposure are internal reactions to new
information. We can distinguish between positive, negative and neutral reactions.
 Banks’ reactions are documented thoroughly for legal reasons and to meet internal organisa-
tional requirements. As in the case of information events, their number rises sharply in the
problem cases, documenting an intensive interaction between bank and debtor:
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 Likewise, the bank’s reactions closely correlate to positive and negative developments in the
six credit relationships:16
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 It may be of special interest to compare the turnaround and the bankruptcy case. Differences
between these two cases in terms of the behaviour of debtors and bank lending officers may
throw light on the reasons why some firms are saved and why others fail. In the following
charts, we demonstrate the different developments with respect to the four aspects discussed
above, i.e. cheap and expensive information, negative and positive signals, bonding activities by
different parties, and positive, negative or neutral reactions by bank lending officers (the cate-
gories are charted in the order given by each header):17
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 These charts might induce the assumption that 1993 was in both cases decisive for the future
progress of the crisis. In the turnaround (K4) all parties showed a willingness to bind them-
selves, and the managers produced at least some positive signals. In the bankruptcy case (K6)
all parties were comparatively passive. Therefore, the following years were marked by a
growing number of negative reactions and a breakdown of informational activities in December18
1994. Both the bank and the owners seemed to have given up the firm, which was declared
bankrupt in October 1995. We can assign approximately the same date to the climax of the
recontracting process for the turnaround.
 This description should not be misinterpreted: We do not suggest that the bankruptcy could
have been avoided by different behaviour at that time. On the contrary, we observe that the
behaviour of managers and owners contains information about the probability of recovery as
seen by these parties, which seemed to be low in the bankruptcy case. The decisions as to
whether to save the firm or allow it to fail may have been taken at a much earlier date. For the
interpretation of long-term lending relationships it is important to note that bank lending offi-
cers deduce the probability of recovery from the behaviour of firm-insiders, which may be eas-
ier and cheaper to observe than the probability of recovery as such.
 
 6 Results and hypotheses
 We can use these six bank-lending stories to formulate some results and hypotheses about
bank-lending behaviour in Germany. The hypotheses put a rather positive interpretation on the
lending relationship, showing that behaviour criticised by other studies as inefficient might have
a rationale in the costs of information and the process of renegotiation. Unfortunately, due to
the small number of intensively studied lending relationships we are not able to prove the hy-
potheses below (and the results must be treated with caution). Consequently, we hope for fur-
ther empirical work on the subject. Our results and hypotheses are as follows:
- If no problems occur in a lending relationship, banks mainly use cheap, internal and retro-
spective information.
- If a crisis arises, the bank sometimes uses more exhaustive and expensive information. The
bank’s willingness to do so appears to depend on what the bank lending officers can learn
about the true state of the firm from the behaviour of the debtor.
- Retrospective information (e.g. balance sheet data) could be interpreted as information
about the debtor’s behaviour and thus as containing information on the debtor’s assessment
of the true state of the firm. If no apparent problems exist, this information could be suffi-
cient to assure the bank that its lending position is safe.
Credit assessment in a long-term lending relationship as described above is mainly concerned
not with the investment programme of the debtor as such, but with the behaviour of the firm’s
insiders. This behaviour provides lending officers with information about the character, reli-
ability and qualifications of the relevant persons, and also about their expectations concerning
the firm’s future success. These observations allow a bank’s lending officers to view the firm
with the eyes of an insider without having access to the information available to insiders. Of
course, this view suffers from many imperfections, including misinterpretation, belated infor-
mation access or even manipulation by the debtor. Nonetheless, the described elements of
monitoring could allow close delegated monitoring at low cost while leaving the debtor a high
degree of freedom and bargaining power.19
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